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Abstract
Introduction
Analysis of linked health data can generate important, even life-saving, insights into population
health. Yet obstacles both legal and organisational in nature can impede this work.
Approach
We focus on three UK infrastructures set up to link and share data for research: the Administrative
Data Research Network, NHS Digital, and the Secure Anonymised Information Linkage Databank.
Bringing an interdisciplinary perspective, we identify key issues underpinning their challenges and
successes in linking health data for research.
Results
We identify examples of uncertainty surrounding legal powers to share and link data, and around data
protection obligations, as well as systemic delays and historic public backlash. These issues require
updated official guidance on the relevant law, approaches to linkage which are planned for impact
and ongoing utility, greater transparency between data providers and researchers, and engagement
with the patient population which is both high-profile and carefully considered.
Conclusions
Health data linkage for research presents varied challenges, to which there can be no single solution.
Our recommendations would require action from a number of data providers and regulators to
be meaningfully advanced. This illustrates the scale and complexity of the challenge of health data
linkage, in the UK and beyond: a challenge which our case studies suggest no single organisation can
combat alone. Planned programmes of linkage are critical because they allow time for organisations
to address these challenges without adversely affecting the feasibility of individual research projects.
Highlights
• Linkage of health data and other forms of public sector
data in the UK is an under-utilised resource for public
interest research.
• We use three UK case studies to examine the obstacles
which prevent this area of research from reaching its full
potential.
• Recommendations are made in respect of each obstacle,
with an emphasis on planned programmes of linkage.
• This should allow data providers time to address the
various governance issues which will inevitably arise in
health data linkage.
Introduction
Analysis of linked health data across national or local popula-
tions has enormous public interest potential. With its capac-
ity to reveal issues in patient pathways, or trends in mortality
which could be addressed through state intervention, it is not
an overstatement to say that data can save lives [1]. Yet even
when the stakes are high, obstacles both legal and practical in
nature can prevent potentially life-preserving work:
Example 1 (Drawn from SAIL Case Study)
In 2010 the Chief Medical Officer for Wales requested research
into the factors underlying the higher mortality rates recorded
during winter. This research required access to anonymised
individual- and household-level data from the Valuation Office
Agency (an agency of HM Revenue and Customs), linked with
health data from the Secure Anonymised Information Linkage
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Databank (‘SAIL’). In their Briefing on what was to become
the Digital Economy Act 2017 or ’DEA’ as we shall refer to it
in this paper, the Royal Statistical Society noted as follows:
‘The request was submitted in April 2010, and le-
gal teams discussed appropriate ways of providing
the data. In February 2012 HMRC confirmed that
they believed they were unable to share the data
due to statutory constraints on data sharing. This
had a negative impact on the implementation of
government policy that might have had an impact
on mortality [2].’
The above example was published in support of a single
statutory power for public authorities to share data for research
in the DEA. There was already evidence that the framework
of laws allowing public authorities to share data for research
was too complicated [3], and it was thought a single generic
power to share data for research purposes would prevent this
kind of impasse for research.
This power was duly introduced in the DEA, passed in 2017
and brought into force in May 2018 (with additional time re-
quired to set up a researcher accreditation system). The type
of data in question—information collected by public authorities
as part of their day-to-day functions—is often referred to in
policy and research circles as ’administrative data.’ The term
is not used within any legislation, and there is no consistently
used terminology for information about citizens collected in
the course of delivering health and other public services. We
use the term as the most useful way of referring to this broad,
overarching category of state-assembled information.
Administrative data are typically used in research in an
‘anonymised’ form to provide information about populations,
not individuals. We will explore the term ‘anonymisation’ in
a subsequent section, but essentially ‘anonymised’ data con-
sist of information which has been processed and protected in
such a way that it no longer relates to an identifiable individ-
ual. This is the meaning of the term under UK and European
data protection law. The Administrative Data Research Net-
work (‘ADRN’) was set up with investment from the Economic
and Social Research Council (‘ESRC’) in 2013 to facilitate re-
searcher access to anonymised administrative data [4]. Senior
members of the ADRN were involved in drafting the research
provisions in the DEA [5]. Even before this new statutory
power was brought into effect, the following second example
illustrates how the ADRN helped to facilitate access to admin-
istrative data:
Example 2 (Drawn from ADRN & SAIL Case
Studies)
This project analysed the Welsh Warm Homes Nest Scheme,
which offered eligible householders free home energy efficiency
improvements such as new boilers, central heating or insula-
tion. A key focus of the scheme was to promote the health of
those who could not afford such measures, particularly during
winter.
Health data from SAIL were linked with dwelling level data
indicating recipients of the scheme, before being accessed in
anonymised form by the researchers through the Administra-
tive Data Research Centre in Wales (part of the ADRN). The
researchers were then able to compare a control group who
were eligible for the fuel efficiency measures but who had not
yet received them, with a group of householders who had re-
ceived the measures. A final linked dataset with the respiratory
events of 16,353 recipients, as well as of 24,895 people in the
control group, was analysed and compared with the respiratory
events in the winter before.
The initial report concluded that further analysis was re-
quired to establish whether the differences in health events
between the recipient and control groups observed at baseline
could be attributed to successful targeting of the scheme [6].
However, the 16,353 fuel efficiency recipients experienced a
3.9% decrease in GP recorded respiratory events in the winter
after the installation (and a 6.5% decrease in recorded asthma
events). The control group, by contrast, saw an increase in
GP recorded respiratory events in the winter after (a 9.8% rise
for respiratory events, and 12.5% increase for asthma events).
This second example can be seen as a positive counterpart
to the first, and perhaps even a sign of progress. Neverthe-
less, concerns remain as to the future of health data linkage
and access for research. Data held by public authority health
service providers (which includes National Health Service –
or ’NHS’– patient data) were excluded from the data sharing
powers under s.64 DEA. It therefore remains unclear how such
NHS data, which we refer to in this paper as ‘health data’, can
lawfully be linked with other public sector information, even
in cases of demonstrable public interest.
The concept of ‘public interest’ is inevitably broad, and
potentially controversial. For the purposes of this paper, how-
ever, we use the term in the meaning bestowed to it for the pur-
poses of the DEA, as this is the purpose for which health data
could have been used had they been included within research
data sharing powers in the new Act. By ‘public interest’, we
therefore mean (inter alia) research whose primary purpose is
to provide evidence for policy evaluation, guide critical decision
making, significantly extend understanding of social trends or
replicate, validate or challenge existing research (including of-
ficial statistics), as these are all included in a non-exhaustive
list of ‘public interest’ features of research for which data may
be shared under the DEA [7].
While the Digital Economy Act framework has not pro-
vided a definitive articulation of ‘public interest’, it has carved
out categories of research of sufficient public importance to
justify the use of de-identified administrative data. Crucially,
it also allows such data to be linked with other information
prior to de-identification disclosure for research purposes, and
thus provides a gateway for research using linked administra-
tive data, on which we focus in this paper. While s.64 DEA
does not explicitly sanction linkage, and merely refers to ‘pro-
cessing’ before disclosure for research, the Explanatory Notes
to the DEA clarify at paragraph 37:
The Act also provides for the use of de-identified
(de-personalised) data to support accredited re-
searchers to access and link data in secure facil-
ities for the purpose of carrying out research for
public benefit.
2
Mourby, M et. al. / International Journal of Population Data Science (2019) 4:1:09
The DEA was therefore intended to provide researchers
with access to linked administrative data for research of
broadly defined public benefit. This could well include re-
search investigating non-biological factors which influence or
indicate public health, by linking health and non-health admin-
istrative data. However, the exclusion of ‘health’ (i.e. health
service) data from that which can be shared under the research
provisions of the DEA means that such research remains a
challenging endeavour. This statutory exclusion means public
authorities within the UK National Health Service (‘NHS’) re-
main reliant on the existing framework of laws already used for
disclosure of information, a framework which can take years
to navigate [8].
As our case studies illustrate, researchers are left with a
difficult landscape when seeking access to linked ‘health’ and
‘non-health’ administrative data. Some of these challenges
are specific to the particular issue of such linkage, others stem
from the complexity of administrative data access in general.
The ADRN was described in its Mid-Term Review Report as
experiencing data access issues with ‘complex origins’ [9], and
the project ended on 31 July 2018 [10]. On 27 September
2018 a new Administrative Data Research Partnership was an-
nounced between UK Research and Innovation and the Office
for National Statistics, with a greater emphasis on identifying
‘shared priorities’ with government departments as a driver for
research [11]. It remains to be seen what this new project
will achieve, but at present it has been suggested in a report
from the Office for Statistics Regulation that, despite their so-
cietal value, success stories in administrative data linkage for
research remain the exception rather than the rule [12].
Added to this, the General Data Protection Regulation
(‘GDPR’) has heightened awareness of the need for lawful dis-
closure of data, and there is some concern that its provisions
relating to pseudonymisation in Article 4 [5] will make data
sharing for research more difficult [13]. The obstacles to data
sharing for research are not purely legal, however. It is also
possible to point to cultures of risk aversion within public au-
thorities which can compound any uncertainty in interpreting
the law [12].
Even where there is a cultural will, and a legal way, linkage
of health data for research requires appropriate resources, ex-
pertise and investment. Negotiation between researchers and
data custodians can be dogged not only by risk aversion, but
also mutual lack of understanding and replication of effort—a
problem which has also been identified outside of the UK [14].
Furthermore, it must also be remembered that health data
sharing is not a purely bilateral relationship, and the views of
the people from whose records administrative data are derived
must be taken into account. Understanding the views of an
entire national population on a question in which its members
will have varying levels of interest and understanding is no
mean feat.
We approach this potential mass of obstacles from a multi-
disciplinary perspective. Focusing on three cases studies, we
delineate key issues which can prevent access to health data
for public interest research and present a corresponding recom-
mendation for each issue. We accept, as others have argued,
that there is no single ‘magic bullet’ which can resolve the is-
sues researchers face in accessing health data [15]. Instead, we
explore these issues through the challenges and successes in
health data sharing highlighted by our case studies, and make
recommendations which reflect the multifaceted nature of the
challenge.
Approach
This paper uses national case studies to examine an issue that,
despite the challenges alluded to above, the UK is well-placed
to address: the potential for linked health and non-health
administrative data to cast light on socio-economic, non-
biological determinants of population health. The Academy
of Medical Sciences has already called for more research into
such factors:
‘there remains much we do not know about the
complex array of interlinking factors that influence
the health of the public, and about how to prevent
and solve the many health challenges we face as a
population [. . . ] Biomedical research as currently
conducted does not have the capacity to address
these increasingly diverse and complex issues that
transcend disciplinary, sectoral and geographical
boundaries. We need to move towards a ‘health
of the public’ approach. . . We must drive forward
an ambitious research agenda to realise the aspi-
rations of successive policymakers and leaders of
health and social care — aspirations to shift our
focus to prevention and early intervention at scale,
and to thereby optimise the use of resources.’ [16]
The breadth of health data held by the NHS across the
population should mean the UK is well-positioned to under-
take this ambitious research agenda. These data are often
acknowledged as a rich resource for data analytics [17], so
much so it was proposed that publicly controlled data should
be granted special legal protection under the Data Protection
Act 2018 [18]. However, it has been recently claimed by the
Office for Statistics Regulation that the value of data linkage
is not currently maximised in the UK [12]. Our case studies
support this claim, indicating that such research could be more
widely used to determine how population health can best be
served by state services.
The UK examples of health data linkage and sharing for
research which we have taken as our case studies are:
1. The ADRN, the above-outlined, ESRC-funded initiative
designed to provide secure linkage of, and access to, ad-
ministrative data for research purposes across the UK.
2. NHS Digital, which is responsible for the national col-
lection and dissemination of health data in England, and
uses statutory powers to do so.
3. The SAIL: a safe haven in Wales which collects data on a
voluntary basis from healthcare providers, and facilitates
safe access to linked data for researchers.
The examples of ADRN and NHS Digital in particular il-
lustrate the challenges of linking health and non-health ad-
ministrative data, whereas SAIL demonstrates one means by
which these obstacles can be successfully negotiated.
Population data science is by nature multi-disciplinary [19];
this is as true of the challenges facing access to linked data
for research as it is of the ultimate analysis of such data. Two
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of the issues identified in this paper are legal in nature, re-
lating to the implementation of the DEA and the GDPR. An-
other three, however, relate more to the infrastructure through
which health data access for research is delivered across the
UK, which will subsist regardless of how these pieces of legis-
lation are construed.
To provide contextual depth to the case studies, the lead
author has reviewed the literature surrounding care.data, the
abandoned health data sharing programme in England which
forms the background to the current data dissemination prac-
tices of NHS Digital. This is in turn contrasted with the volun-
tary health data collection approaches adopted in other parts
of the UK [20,21], with reference to the academic literature
on care.data [15,22-25], the subsequent review of health data
sharing conducted by the National Data Guardian [26], and
the government’s response [27]. Other reports, consultations
and policy papers on data sharing have been reviewed, which
point towards the future of linked health data research in the
UK [8,12,16,28-30], as well as some of the issues health data
sharing might face [3].
The case studies themselves have been conducted with
reference to published information relating to the three or-
ganisations in question. Information relating to the ADRN,
its successes [31], challenges [9], and evolution [32] are relied
upon, with emphasis on information made publicly available
wherever possible. The same approach has been taken with
information about NHS Digital: its guidance [33], public in-
formation, and particularly its release registers [34] have been
scrutinised. SAIL has, likewise, been studied from its publicly
available information [35,36]. These sources of information
have informed the iterative, interdisciplinary discussions be-
tween the authors, and the agreed list of issues and recom-
mendations with which this paper concludes.
A summary of each case study is provided in the ’Results’
section below, in which issues are identified which have wider
implications for health data sharing.
Results
Case Study 1: The Administrative Data Re-
search Network
While our second two case studies relate to England and Wales
respectively, the ADRN was an attempt to bridge the data di-
visions across the UK.
The genesis of the ADRN was the report of the Adminis-
trative Data Taskforce in 2012. The Taskforce, set up by the
Economic and Social Research Council, made the following
recommendations:
1. An Administrative Data Research Centre should be es-
tablished in each of the four countries in the UK.
2. Legislation should be enacted to facilitate research ac-
cess to administrative data and to allow data linkage
between departments to take place more efficiently.
3. A single UK-wide researcher accreditation process, built
on best national and international practice, should be
established.
4. A strategy for engaging with the public should be insti-
tuted.
5. Sufficient funds should be put in place to support im-
proved research access to, and linkage between, admin-
istrative data [28].
While these recommendations were accepted by the gov-
ernment [37] and put into practice, the needs highlighted by
the report six years ago remain relevant beyond the lifespan of
the ADRN: particularly 2), 4) and 5).
The ADRN was duly set up with four Administrative Data
Research Centres (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ire-
land) to facilitate access to administrative data for approved
researchers. Where researchers required linked administrative
data a ‘Trusted Third Party’ model was used, in which the
identifiable data required for linkage are separated from the
sensitive health or service data required for research. Under
a Trusted Third Party model, no one individual is privy to
identifiable sensitive data that they do not already hold. The
confidentiality of the information is protected by separating
the identifying information (e.g. names) from the substantive
information about the individuals in question, i.e. the content
of their records.
Despite the statutory uncertainty surrounding health data
linkage for research, it is evidently not impossible. The 106
projects listed on ADRN’s featured research page [31] include
sixteen studies using linked data from NHS Digital, and nine
which use such data for research which does not focus exclu-
sively on the health service, for example:
• An evaluation of how special education needs provision
for children with Down syndrome impacts upon emer-
gency hospitalisations [38];
• An exploration of the links between job characteristics
and health [39];
• Development of an Index of Multiple Deprivation; iden-
tifying the area most in need of public investment [40];
• Exploring the relationship of education and health out-
comes for children and young people in England [41].
That said, many of these projects required protracted ne-
gotiations for data access which would not have been possible
without a significant commitment of researcher time. The
last project listed, for example, required 3 years, 11 months,
6 meetings and at least 108 email and telephone correspon-
dences to gain approval for linkage of the required data,
against a backdrop of a shifting legal landscape [42]. Ac-
cess proved an issue across the ADRN as a whole, particularly
where the data in question were requested from a central gov-
ernment department. The ADRN Mid-Term Review Report
found that there was ‘near-unanimous agreement that lack of
administrative data from government departments is the single
biggest challenge that the Network faces’ [9]. While uncer-
tainty surrounding interpretations of powers to share data was
not the sole cause of this difficulty, it was experienced as a
significant factor by those involved.
Issue 1: The lack of a clear legal route for linking
health and non-health administrative data, even when re-
search using such linked data might benefit public health.
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In response to the difficulty of accessing administrative
data, Thematic Partnerships were established to focus research
efforts on a few, large datasets to which the Network could
negotiate access [32]. The ADRN acknowledged that its ad
hoc pursuit of linkage projects, as requested by individual re-
searchers, was not an efficient way of effecting impactful re-
search. Long delays in negotiating access to data had to be
justified by a ‘high-yield’ result, ideally a result which could
be used by multiple projects to maximise the potential public
benefit from the time and resources spent on achieving the
linkage. The original model of the project was therefore aban-
doned in its latter stages. The ADRN project came to an
end on 31 July 2018 [10], with the scale of its original am-
bitions recognised as not realised in full owing to difficulties
in accessing data [12]. It has since been succeeded by the
Administrative Data Research Partnership, which furthers the
model of thematic partnerships and planned programmes of
linkage.
A review of the featured research suggests that the major-
ity of ADRN-supported research did not cross national bound-
aries. The Me-D-Links study, approved in July 2016, is de-
scribed as ‘one of the first, if not the first, projects conducted
within the ADRN using data from all 4 regions of the UK’ [43].
The issue of linking health and administrative data across na-
tional boundaries within the UK may be a point on which
further work is needed. If the UK cannot harmonise its gover-
nance for health data sharing, more ambitious projects using
information from beyond the UK are a far-off prospect.
Issue 2: Ad hoc linkage is less efficient than planned
linkage projects, and data governance could be better
harmonised to support cross-centre sharing, particularly
across national boundaries.
Case Study 2: NHS Digital
‘NHS Digital’ is the working name of the statutory Health and
Social Care Information Centre (’HSCIC’), a name adopted fol-
lowing the controversy surrounding the care.data programme.
The original stated aims of the care.data programme were en-
tirely laudable: supporting patient choice, advancing customer
services, promoting greater transparency, improving outcomes,
increasing accountability and driving economic growth by mak-
ing England a centre for world-class health services research
[44]. However, the programme encountered significant issues
in its implementation, issues which led to its ultimate aban-
donment. It was intended to achieve its aims by bringing
health and social care data in England together under the
governance of the newly established HSCIC, for dissemination
to researchers in pseudonymised form.
The time frame in which care.data was originally intended
to be implemented proved problematic. Academic commen-
tators emphasised the need for adequate consultation to sat-
isfy the law of confidentiality [45]. General Practitioners were
given eight weeks to inform patients that data would be pro-
vided to the new HSCIC. This prompted an outcry from GPs
[25].
A subsequent leaflet campaign intended to make good the
informational deficit was threatened with a letter before action
[46]. The programme was paused, reviewed by the National
Data Guardian (who supported re-naming the HSCIC to em-
phasise its status as part of the NHS ‘family’ [26]) and finally
abandoned in July 2016.
The HSCIC was renamed NHS Digital from July 2016 in
order to build public confidence and trust [47]. NHS Digital
continues to collect and disseminate health data in England.
The overwhelming majority of the releases have been made
to other NHS organisations or local authorities, alongside a
smaller number of releases to ‘for-profit’ entities and univer-
sity researchers.
Anonymisation plays a key role in NHS Digital’s dissem-
ination of health data for research. A review of its release
registers [48] for December 2016 to May 2018 suggests that
between 76% (3352/4410 in December 2016—February 2017)
and 86% (5238/6107 September-November 2017) of releases
were justified on the basis of anonymisation to the standard set
by the Information Commissioner’s Office (‘ICO’) [49]. There
is also evidence that the public prefers health data shared for
research to be ‘anonymous’ [50], meaning that such process-
ing might be helpful for engaging public trust or confidence in
data sharing. However, it is not clear what members of the
public understand by the term ‘anonymous.’ The word could
be interpreted, for example, as meaning a type of data in which
identification of individuals is impossible in any context; this
is, according to the UK Anonymisation Network (‘UKAN’),
not possible as anonymity cannot be assessed independently
of environment [51]. The reality of what is required by the
ICO is data which do not give rise to a reasonable likelihood
of identification in the context of a particular environment; an
environment which could change and must be kept under re-
view [49]. Anonymisation is therefore not a complete solution
to the problem of securing trust and confidence in dissemi-
nation of health data: the public does not necessarily have a
clear picture of the persisting risks of identification, and man-
agement of such risks can be complex—hence why the UKAN
Anonymisation Decision-Making Framework has 10 compo-
nents [51].
The accompanying statutory power for these ‘anonymised’
disclosures is listed in the release registers as the Health and
Social Care Act 2012 (‘HSCA’). As the most recent register
(May-September 2018) has clarified, this means s.261 HSCA
[48], which contains a provision which limits the ‘why’ of dis-
closure (i.e. the purpose for which data can be shared), but
not the ‘who’, i.e. the types of people or organisations with
whom they can be shared. Consequently, a number of dif-
ferent types of public and private organisations have received
‘anonymised’ data under this provision, on the basis that their
requests were deemed to be for the purpose of health or social
care, or for the promotion of health.
Where data are not anonymised, authorisation of uncon-
sented use of identifiable health data is usually processed via
recommendations from the Health Research Authority’s Con-
fidentiality Advisory Group ‘CAG’. This group typically meets
once or twice a month [52] to assess applications, and pub-
lished case studies suggest that applying for CAG approval
can be a lengthy process [11]. If obtaining data through this
route is already challenging for some researchers, it is difficult
to envisage how this system could deal with the number of
access requests currently processed via ‘anonymisation’ of the
health data. As such, it is troubling that there are suggestions
that the administrative data in general [13], and health data
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in particular [53], will become more difficult to anonymise and
share under the GDPR.
Issue 3: Existing challenges in processing health data
for research could be compounded by the uncertainty
surrounding the GDPR.
Under its Service Level Agreement, NHS Digital commits
to response times of 14 working days for standard requests;
30 for ‘medium’ requests and 60 working days for more com-
plex requests. However, the experience of many researchers is
that these timescales can be significantly exceeded. This can
be particularly challenging for publicly funded academic re-
searchers, who often work to tight funding deadlines. As the
2017 Life Sciences Industrial Review highlighted, where linked
data are requested, multiple (independently considered) appli-
cations may be required, and the involvement of the CAG can
lead to significant delays [8].
Issue 4: The delay and uncertainty of timescales of
health data access for research is a problem, especially
for publicly funded academic researchers.
Case Study 3: SAIL
In Wales, access to a wide range of health datasets has been
greatly improved through the establishment of SAIL. SAIL op-
erates as a secure safe haven for anonymised health data in
Wales. As within the ADRN, a Trusted Third Party model
is used for linkage, although in the case of SAIL the Trusted
Third Party is the NHS (Wales) Informatics Service, so confi-
dential patient information remains within the health service.
Linked data are then accessed by researchers via the SAIL
Gateway, a remote access technology and analysis platform
enabling approved researchers to access data within the SAIL
virtual environment from their own desktop anywhere in the
world. The protocols in place allow user authentication and
monitoring, and prevent the alteration or removal of SAIL data
by users.
This model has proved to be a highly successful develop-
ment both in terms of data security and data access, such
that this infrastructure improves health data accessibility for
research whilst maintaining confidentiality. SAIL can reduce
the time traditionally taken to provide access to data to pre-
vent health research being delayed or abandoned. The ap-
provals process is designed with researchers in mind, so that
scoping may be done before funding is requested, and the av-
erage time for Information Governance Review Panel approval
to access data is 12 weeks, including time taken to undertake
any necessary Safe Researcher Training.
SAIL also offers an example of successful public engage-
ment to support health data sharing. A 2013 report by the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development com-
mended its multifaceted efforts to engage with stakeholders,
including public representation via a consumer panel and steer-
ing groups [54]. The public engagement work undertaken by
SAIL is clearly instructive, and worth taking into account as
a precedent. Since 2011, SAIL has had a thriving and ac-
tive Consumer Panel comprising members of the public with
a variety of interest areas. The Panel advises SAIL on data
protection issues in data-intensive research from the perspec-
tive of service users and carers. Researchers are encouraged
to meet with the Panel to discuss their proposals and receive
a public viewpoint and advice; as such, SAIL can support in-
dividual projects to conduct appropriate engagement on their
proposed use of administrative data.
The Office for Statistics Regulation contrasts SAIL’s ‘tan-
dem’ approach with the top-down evolution of NHS Digital,
who (they suggest) are not entirely confident of their social
licence to share data [12]. Another difference is that SAIL
involves researchers and methodologists who understand how
data are used for research, whereas NHS Digital is separate
from academia. The gradual development of SAIL in collabo-
ration with various stakeholders compares positively with the
history of care.data from the previous case study. It cannot be
assumed that the same engagement model can be adopted for
every project, or even for data-sharing infrastructure. There
is no ‘cut-and-paste’ model of engagement that we would en-
dorse in all situations, regardless of the source of the data, the
operational model of the research or the particular sensitivities
of the affected groups. However, the process by which SAIL’s
engagement model was developed—gradually, and with time
for feedback from data providers, the public and the research
community to be taken into account—is a helpful precedent for
future data-sharing infrastructure, and in particular structures
set up to share administrative data (health or non-health) for
research. This further underscores the importance of planned
programmes of data linkage, which allow time and resources
for the development of appropriate engagement mechanisms.
Issue 5: Securing and maintaining the social licence
for administrative data sharing remains a challenge.
Recommendations & Discussion
In light of the above case studies, and the issues they highlight,
we propose the following recommendations:
1) A clear legal route should be identified to enable link-
age of health and non-health administrative data for pub-
lic interest research.
This recommendation relates to the first issue identified within
the ADRN case study: the lengthy negotiations which can re-
sult from uncertainty around legal powers to link and share
administrative data for research.
In England, the NHS Act 2006 governs the use of iden-
tifiable patient information for ‘medical purposes’, which is
defined as encompassing ‘medical’ research [55]. It is this pro-
vision, with its requirement for research to be ‘medical’, which
is the most commonly used ground for processing identifiable
data for research linkage where data subject consent is not
practicable [56] (as is usually the case where administrative
data are used for research, as evidenced by the NHS Digi-
tal release registers). In its current published standards, NHS
Digital indicates that de-identified data should be used for
purposes other than direct care, such as epidemiology [33]. In
such cases access requests must usually satisfy the broader (if
not entirely uncontentious) requirement of being for the pro-
vision of health care or adult social care, or for the promotion
of health, under s.261 HSCA.
Researchers seeking to study (for example) the optimisa-
tion of non-health services for health benefits run the risk that
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their research will be deemed non-medical, and will thus find it
difficult to demonstrate how the identifiable data can be law-
fully processed for linkage. Detailed guidance as to the exact
scope of ‘medical purposes’, and indeed medical research, is
limited, but the Health Research Authority gives the example:
‘requests to access patient information to inform
road traffic management planning could not be
approved as the primary purpose would not sup-
port health service improvements.’ [57]
This is interesting, as it suggests that planning services
other than the health service goes beyond the ‘medical’, even
where such services impact upon health. For example, a study
of the health impacts of building busy roads near primary
schools could be deemed to be out of scope, however per-
tinent the public health concerns it would address.
The DEA could have been the answer to this ‘medical
purpose’ quandary, but health data were excluded after repre-
sentations were made about the need to protect patient con-
fidentiality [58], even though the Act does not allow identi-
fiable data to be disclosed to researchers (only for it to be
processed securely, de-identified and then disclosed). As the
DEA has now been debated and passed with the exclusion,
however, it remains to be determined how health and non-
health administrative data can be lawfully linked for research.
The well-documented pressures on the NHS demand that re-
search enabling optimisation of other services for better public
health be properly supported.
A review of the legal options suggests a number of possible
routes:
1. NHS Digital could disclose information to the Office
for National Statistics using existing legal powers (e.g.
s.45A Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007); the
Office for National Statistics could then link these data
and share them in a de-identified state under the DEA,
or under s.39 [4] of the Statistics and Registration Ser-
vice Act.
2. It could be clarified whether the scope of ‘medical re-
search’ can include research using non-health data. This
could be research which uses non-health data to evaluate
healthcare (e.g. using disability benefit data to assess
clinical outcomes), or which links such data with medical
records to measure the health impacts of public policy,
or to study important socio-economic determinants of
health.
3. NHS Digital could act as a Trusted Third Party for other
public authorities, receive data, link them with health
data and disclose them to researchers in de-identified
form for the promotion of health under s.261 HSCA.
It must be stressed that we are not recommending new
grounds on which identifiable data can be provided to re-
searchers, but simply to enable the processing of identifiable
data for linkage in a secure environment for analyses of de-
identified data. Whatever the route, updated guidance from
(for example) the Health Research Authority would help to
clarify the circumstances in which health data can be linked
with other types of data for research, and the appropriate
scope of ‘medical research.’
It is hoped that that NHS Digital, and those working to
implement the research provisions of the DEA, will find an
appropriate route to link health and non-health administra-
tive data. If no point of intersection between the statutory
regimes can be found, legislative amendment may be neces-
sary for ‘joined-up’ data to be routinely available.
2) Research data providers should adopt planned ap-
proaches to linkage, based on privacy by design prin-
ciples.
The decision within ADRN to focus on a few high-value
datasets, for which linkage is feasible, is comparable to in-
ternational attempts to construct routine ongoing linkage sys-
tems [59], as well as to SAIL’s approach to linkage. In each
case, resources are allocated to identifying datasets that have
a high research value that would be enhanced through linkage
to other datasets, and linkage is then performed to support a
range of unspecified future research projects.
A prospective, proactive, or ‘planned’ approach to linkage
means governance issues surrounding identifiable data linkage
can be addressed separately from the question of anonymous
or pseudonymised data sharing for research. The legal, po-
litical and technical aspects of data linkage can take many
years to navigate, while the task of processing requests for de-
identified data that have already been linked is comparatively
easy. In carrying out planned linkage, high-value linkages (e.g.
those likely to support multiple research projects) are identified
and data providers can focus on the question of whether they
have the legal power to carry out the linkage, identify a law-
ful pathway (should there be one), develop technical solutions
for implementation (involving a third party if necessary), and
then begin the process of linkage. The question of whether
anonymised extracts can then be shared with a specific ap-
plicant for a specific application can then be addressed as a
subsequent process, with much less delay to researchers.
This approach is resource-efficient and provides opportu-
nity to reduce and isolate one of the biggest components in the
cost barrier to research using linked data. It lends itself readily
to incorporation and monitoring of systems for safe data stor-
age and access (e.g. safe havens). It allows for expertise in
linkage to accrue and the quality of linkages to be refined over
time. It also means that data custodians have the opportunity
to provide well-signposted routes to data access and dataset
listings so researchers can see what is available and how to get
there.
For planned linkage to be truly far-sighted, it would be pru-
dent for data controllers to operate along consistent principles
of data governance. The GDPR contains a broad stipulation
that data protection principles should be built in ‘by design
and by default’ when processing personal data, but does not
provide specific guidance as to how to operationalise this re-
quirement. While the GDPR’s ‘privacy by design’ requirement
provides a useful starting point for research data providers,
further work could be done to harmonise implementation of
key features of this central requirement, such as how ‘data
minimisation’ is interpreted when data are linked with a view
to retention and multiple research use.
For example, the GDPR has broad requirements of ap-
propriate data security and record keeping, but exactly how
to operationalise these obligations is left to individual organ-
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isations. If similar technical and organisational measures are
adopted across data-holding bodies, these entities are better
placed to share data with each other, as each can offer broadly
equivalent levels of protection of the data. Consistent, privacy-
preserving principles could thus help facilitate data sharing and
cross-centre working.
A greater level of data sharing within the different nations
of the UK would build upon what the ADRN began to achieve
within its five-year tenure.
3) Guidance on health data sharing under the GDPR
should be proportionate to identification risk.
Our third recommendation is drawn from the NHS Digital case
study, which highlights both the importance of anonymisation
for the dissemination of linked health data in the UK, and the
potential for the GDPR to disrupt current systems for data
sharing.
NHS Digital is heavily reliant on the ICO’s standards for
anonymisation. Under these standards, the majority of the re-
leases to researchers in December 2016-September 2018 have
been deemed to be anonymous. If this significant majority of
releases were re-interpreted as disclosures of personal data, this
could require large-scale authorisation by CAG (or some alter-
native body nominated by the Secretary of State for Health).
Aside from the considerable resource and infrastructural chal-
lenge this would pose, there is also a risk that research of
real public interest would be excluded on the grounds that it
does not meet a narrow definition of ‘medical’ research (see
recommendation 1).
At the time of writing, the UK ICO has yet to release their
updated guidance on anonymisation under the GDPR. They
have indicated that their existing, pre-GDPR guidance is ‘a
good starting point’, suggesting that this guidance (used by
NHS Digital as a benchmark for disclosure) can still validly be
followed under the GDPR [60]. However, until this updated
guidance is released, a degree of caution is justified.
The crux of the matter is the relationship between
anonymisation and pseudonymisation under the GDPR. The
GDPR clearly defines pseudonymisation in Article 4 [5] as a
process by which personal data are ‘minimised’ (i.e. rendered
less identifiable) but nonetheless remain personal. For an or-
ganisation such as NHS Digital which pseudonymises data but
holds the original identifiers, these identifiers are a ‘means rea-
sonably likely to be used’ to identify individuals. Therefore,
they would be deemed to be processing personal data when
using pseudonymised data.
What are less clear, however, are the conditions under
which data that have been pseudonymised can become anony-
mous when shared with a third party who has no means of
identification (such as a researcher). A reasonable interpreta-
tion would be that if the researcher, as a member of another
organisation, does not have access to the identifiers, or any
other means reasonably likely to be used to identify individu-
als, then by definition individuals are not ‘identifiable’ and the
data should not be considered personal for the researcher’s
organisation. The ICO’s updated guidance is potentially sup-
portive of this interpretation:
‘In order to be truly anonymised under the GDPR,
you must strip personal data of sufficient elements
that mean the individual can no longer be identi-
fied. However, if you could at any point use any
reasonably available means to re-identify the in-
dividuals to which the data refers, that data will
not have been effectively anonymised but will have
merely been pseudonymised. This means that de-
spite your attempt at anonymisation you will con-
tinue to be processing personal data.’ [60]
The emphasis on ‘you’ appears still to be directed at an
individual organisation. If ‘you’ as a data user do not at any
point have any means reasonably likely to be used to identify
the data, the data could be deemed non-identifiable.
The only caveat to this interpretation is the question of
how NHS Digital, or any other data provider, gains sufficient
assurances that a researcher would not have a means rea-
sonably likely to be used to identify individuals. This was
the case before the GDPR, as the distinction for personal or
anonymous data was essentially the same: can the controller
in question (or anyone else who has access to their data) iden-
tify individuals by any means reasonably likely to be used?
The challenge post-GDPR is still to determine whether rea-
sonably likely means of identification have been excluded, and
therefore whether data can be called anonymised or merely
pseudonymised. What is uncertain, however, is whether the
ICO uses its updated guidance to introduce new and more
stringent standards as to when shared data can be called
‘anonymised.’ We cannot discount this possibility, given the
time the ICO has taken in the revision and the concerns cited
above.
Where data have been linked, and then shared for research,
the pseudo-identifiers themselves are not necessarily the issue,
as these can easily be generated randomly and separately for
each project. The question relates more to what other data
sources may be combined with the payload research data. For
example, access to identifiable information about some peo-
ple’s health histories (even the researcher’s own history) would
potentially allow their re-identification in hospital data using
information about dates and types of treatment.
In the case of ADRN, a careful data situation audit was
conducted of the controlled environment in which researchers
accessed data [51]. SAIL relies upon a suite of controls in-
cluding Safe Researcher Training, data access agreements,
and a secure Virtual Private Network for researchers to ac-
cess prepared datasets, to control how data are used and
minimise identification risk [61]. Thus far, NHS Digital has
not altered in its reliance on ‘anonymised’ releases to re-
searchers post GDPR, as the majority of its May-September
2018 releases are still defined as ‘Anonymised–ICO code com-
pliant’[48]. What remains to be seen is what impact, if any,
the new UK Anonymisation Code has on these significant num-
bers of releases currently disseminated on the basis they are
‘anonymised.’ The implementation of the GDPR may mean
that safe havens such as SAIL or ADRN, which have the re-
sources to exercise scrutiny over (re)identification risk, are all
the more important to the lawful sharing of health data for
research.
Clearly, work is needed between health data providers and
regulators. The ICO’s pre-GDPR guidance on anonymisation
states that determination of whether data are personal calls
for ‘sensible judgement based on the circumstances of the case
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in hand’ [49]. It is hoped that this sense of proportionality is
maintained in the dissemination of health data for research,
even under the GDPR, so that public interest research is not
impeded.
4) Organisations providing health data for research
should have in place clear, transparent and efficient re-
sponse times.
Building on one of the recommendations of the 2017 Life Sci-
ences Industrial Review [8], organisations linking and dissem-
inating health data for research—be they public authorities
or independent safe havens—should provide clear, transparent
and reasonable timescales for researchers wishing to access
linked data. Additionally, we suggest that the management
of data access requests for academic research should be de-
lineated from the management of other types of request, with
timescales for academic applications reported separately, and
guidance made available to academic researchers on how to
demonstrate the necessary benefits in their application.
The example of NHS Digital illustrates how academic re-
quests for data access can suffer when processed alongside
operational applications. Applications from other public au-
thorities have been streamlined [62,63], and private compa-
nies may have sufficient resources to play the long game [64].
For academic researchers working to tight funding deadlines,
however, delay can be fatal to a project. Research grants typ-
ically provide between one and five years’ funding, and require
research activities to be costed in detail at the outset. Nev-
ertheless, costs for data provision and linkage are often not
quoted until after many months, sometimes years, of work has
been poured into applications.
Publicly funded researchers need reasonably foreseeable
timescales when they apply to access health data: we suggest
that transparency, as well as efficiency, is key to achieving this
aim. Data applications for academic research form a small
minority of applications: a review of NHS Digital’s Data Re-
leases from July 2015 to February 2017 conducted by one of
the authors suggests about 4% of these releases were made to
universities. It should be possible for data providers to report
timings separately from application to approval for this type
of applications, and thus provide the foreseeability academic
researchers require.
Academic requests may also suffer when considered along-
side those with a more operational focus because their benefits
can be more difficult to define in the short term. The benefits
of research for the health service are inevitably uncertain; they
depend on the nature of the research findings, and how other
actors (e.g. policy makers) respond to them. In contrast,
service commissioners, local authorities or commercial compa-
nies often use data for pre-specified monitoring, accounting,
or for creating dashboards to show how a service is perform-
ing. Thus a one-size-fits-all application system fails to address
these very different contexts, and researchers can be required
to be unrealistically definitive about benefits. Delineation of
academic applications from other types of data access request
could help to focus on the particular requirements and benefits
of academic uses of health data.
As a minimum, clarity and consistency of timescales for
data access is a must for publicly funded research, which is
never free of its own mandatory deadlines. This may be easier
to achieve where linkage is carried out in a planned way (see
recommendation 2).
5) Public engagement should be ‘by design and default’
in systems for health data sharing, including accessible
information on data sharing, and promotion of the value
of health data research to the NHS and to society.
The contrast between the evolution of SAIL and of NHS Digi-
tal highlights not only the importance of engagement with key
publics, but also the need to develop an engagement strategy
suitable to the project or infrastructure in question.
Public engagement and involvement must be not only
recognised as important, but also as requiring tailoring to
the project in question—for example, depending on the data
which are to be used and the proposed operational model of
the research. There is developing nuance within the literature
surrounding public attitudes towards health data linkage for
research. A 2016 systematic review has revealed widespread,
but conditional, support for data linkage and sharing in health
research [50]. These conditions have been further explored in a
discrete choice experiment, which stressed that (for example)
the type of data in question, i.e. what kind of information
it contained and where it originated from, was a far more
important factor to respondents than the type of researcher
(academic or commercial) accessing the data [65]. It cannot
be assumed, therefore, that patients will feel equally support-
ive of all academic research, and projects using cross-sectoral
linked data may require a more rigorous consideration of public
acceptability than those exclusively using linked health data.
We accept, however, that there may be common principles
which underpin the development of a public engagement and
involvement strategy. An international consensus statement
has emphasised transparency, inclusivity, clarity of purpose,
designed to produce impact and ability to be evaluated as
core principles within public involvement and engagement in
research [66]. These principles echo the themes which arise
from our own recommendations (see below). We therefore
suggest that these principles be taken into account when de-
veloping engagement strategies, and refer readers to this con-
sensus statement for further detail. The development of a
strategy will involve a selection of the appropriate mechanism,
or combination of mechanisms, to engage with stakeholders
and the wider public; for example a public panel (such as
that used by SAIL [67]), exploratory workshops, a more inten-
sive ‘co-design’ model, or a more information-based campaign
which provides transparency without necessarily seeking feed-
back.
While individual projects may be able to engage success-
fully with small numbers of people (e.g. a patient panel), a
high-impact dissemination of information is more feasible on a
national scale. The fact that ADRN particularly struggled to
access UK government data suggests that NHS Digital may
not be unique in its concern about social acceptance of data
sharing for research [12]. Ultimately, a high-profile engage-
ment campaign from institutions such as the Department of
Health (as promised, at least to an extent, in the response
to the National Data Guardian’s review of opt outs [27]) is
needed to remedy any informational deficit. The patient pop-
ulation must be made aware of the risks and benefits of the
use of linked health data for research, in order to secure the
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ongoing public acceptance of this important area of work.
Conclusion
The themes which emerge from our recommendations are clar-
ity, transparency and efficiency. Clarity as to legal powers to
link public sector data—and the limitations created by data
protection law—could be achieved through updated guidance.
Clarity from data providers as to timescales for data access,
and how to demonstrate appropriate public benefit in research
proposals, would assist researchers, as well as efficiency in data
request management. Meaningful transparency with the pa-
tient population is also essential, and should be informed by
careful, evidence-based reflection.
In light of the myriad legal, political and social issues which
must be considered prior to linkage of public sector data, we
advocate a planned approach. If data of high value for research
is identified for linkage, with a view to making it available to
appropriate projects at a later date, there is time to clarify
legal issues, provide transparent frameworks for researchers,
and inform or involve patient groups as appropriate. Despite
the challenges faced by ADRN, investment in planned linkage
holds much promise as a means to overcome the key obstacles
to health data linkage. It is hoped that such approaches will
be adopted more widely, so that the public interest potential of
linked health data in the UK does not remain an under-utilised
resource.
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